北大经院工作坊| Responsibility Sharing in a Public Bad Experiment
行为和实验经济学工作坊
主讲人：贺思民（上海财经大学必赢线路检测3003no1常任副教授）
主持老师：（北大经院）陆方文
参与老师：
（北大经院）平新乔、秦雪征、庄晨、曹光宇
（北大光华）孟涓涓、高彧
（北大现代农学院）刘承芳、罗仁福、候玲玲、王悦
（北大教育学院）杨钋、丁延庆、马莉萍、朱琼
时间：2024年4月26日（周五）10:00-11:30
地点：必赢线路检测3003no1302会议室
主讲人简介：
贺思民现任上海财经大学必赢线路检测3003no1的常任副教授，2020年获国家自然科学基金优秀青年科学基金资助。她的研究兴趣是行为与实验经济学，最近研究的主题包括合作与协调博弈、行为机制设计、信念更新等。她的工作发表在国际管理学与经济学权威期刊，如Management Science, Journal of Economic Theory, Economic Journal, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Games and Economic Behavior等。她曾主持国家自然科学基金青年项目（已结题，获评特优），论文获上海市哲学社会科学优秀成果一等奖。
摘要：
We propose a novel mechanism to mitigate socially undesirable behavior (e.g., pollution, corruption, tax avoidance) framed as the provision of public bads in large groups. Players first choose their social network, where having a greater number of partners brings benefits. Subsequently, they decide whether to provide a public bad that yields benefits to themselves but imposes costs on the entire society. In the event of providing the public bad, there is a small chance of being detected and subsequently punished. In our proposed responsibility-sharing mechanism, if a player is detected providing the public bad, all their partners also face punishment. Both the theoretical analysis and experimental results strongly support the effectiveness of this mechanism in inducing socially desirable outcomes. Furthermore, in an additional experimental treatment, we find that the mechanism is less effective when the undesirable behavior is private information, despite players having the option to voluntarily disclose such information.
供稿单位：科研与博士后办公室
