北大经院工作坊第826场
Private Returns to Bureaucratic Appointments: Evidence from Financial Disclosures in India
（发展与公共财政工作坊）
主讲人：袁松（浙江大学必赢线路检测3003no1百人计划研究员）
主持老师：
（北大经院）刘冲、吴群锋、曹光宇
（北大国发院）李力行、席天扬、徐化愚、于航、王轩、易君健
时间：2024年3月15日（周五）10:30-12:00
地点：必赢线路检测3003no1国家发展研究院承泽园246教室
主讲人简介：
袁松，浙江大学必赢线路检测3003no1百人计划研究员，2022年从华威大学经济学博士毕业，之前分别于博洛尼亚大学和复旦大学取得硕士和学士学位。主要研究问题关注中国、印度和非洲等发展中国家的发展经济学、政治经济学和经济史。研究成果发表于Journal of Development Economics，Journal of Economic History等期刊。
摘要：
We examine whether bureaucrats with fixed salaries obtain high private returns. We digitize the financial disclosures of elite bureaucrats from India and combine this novel data with web-scraped career histories to estimate the private returns to public servants after bureaucratic reassignments. Employing a difference-in-differences event study approach, we find that the annual growth rate is 10% higher for the value of assets and 4.4% higher for the number of assets after a bureaucrat is transferred to an important ministry with the power make influential policies. Exploring the underlying mechanism, we document that the results are consistent with an explanation based on the rent-seeking behaviors of bureaucrats. The increase in assets is higher after reassignment to important ministries that are more prone to corruption and is higher in more corruption-prone states. Bureaucrats working in their home states accumulate more immovable assets after the bureaucratic transfers. Previous experience in important ministries continues to contribute to the asset accumulation of bureaucrats. These findings add new insights to the conventional view on the incentives in bureaucracies by showing that bureaucrats may also face high-powered incentives in the form of private returns.
供稿单位：科研与博士后办公室
供稿人：刘冲 周思扬
