北大经院工作坊第752场
Labor Coercion and Trade:
Evidence from Colonial Indonesia
经济史工作坊
主讲人：Mark Hup (Peking University)
主持老师：（北大经院）赵一泠
参与老师：
（北大经院）郝煜、管汉晖、周建波
（北大光华）颜色
（北大国发院）席天扬、于航
时间：2023年11月9日（周四）12:00-13:30
地点：必赢线路检测3003no1305会议室
主讲人简介：
Mark Hup is an Assistant Professor at Peking University's School of Economics. His research mainly touches on economic history, public economics, and labor economics.
摘要：
What determines the use of labor coercion? This paper studies the impact of trade on an important form of coercion in colonial Indonesia: the payment of taxation in the form of labor, a practice known as corvée labor. To do so, I construct the first database on corvée labor usage and exports covering sixteen Indonesian residencies over forty-one years (1900-1940). I find trade expansions, especially of labor-intensive exports, reduced corvée usage. This effect runs through laborers buying themselves out of corvée duties. The buy-out option enabled high-productivity laborers to self-select out of corvée without requiring stronger information-collection capabilities of the state. Through increased buyouts, the fall in in-kind taxation was mirrored by a rise in monetary taxation. The opposite took place during the trade collapse of the Great Depression. While some studies find a positive relationship between trade and private labor coercion, I argue public labor coercion follows a different logic due to the state's encompassing interest. The nature of the relationship between coercer and coerced is thus key in understanding labor coercion.
必赢线路检测3003no1金融工程实验室
“对话投资总监”系列讲座
2023年第十一讲：探寻基本面+量化的系统化投资
主讲人：刘斌（嘉实基金量化投资总监、董事总经理）
主持老师：（北大经院）黎新平
时间：2023年11月9日（周四）19:00-21:30
地点：必赢线路检测3003no1219会议室
主要内容：
本次讲座结合主讲人多年投资实践经验，讨论A股投资中量化投资与基本面投资的优劣，探讨构建量化与基本面深度结合的系统化投资体系，并对这一体系量化因子模型、景气行业配置、风险模型、系统化主动投资等4个核心层次展开讨论。
主讲人简介：
刘斌，嘉实基金董事总经理，量化投资总监、增强风格投资总监。清华大学工学学士、中国科学院工学博士。具有17年基金从业经验，14年基金管理经验。2006年加入长盛基金管理有限公司，担任基金经理、金融工程与量化投资部总监、公司投资决策委员会委员。2013年加入嘉实基金管理有限公司，曾任股票投资部Alpha策略组组长和股票投资决策委员会委员，担任量化投资总监、增强风格投资总监、全国社保理事会投资经理，负责包括量化股票、指数增强、对冲绝对收益在内的主动量化业务。目前管理多只公募基金、全国社保理事会量化股票组合，规模合计约200亿。2015年获得人民日报社旗下证券时报评选的第11届中国基金业明星基金奖，2022年获得全国社保理事会颁发的“3年贡献养老表彰奖”，2022年嘉实量化精选基金获得晨星三年、五年五星基金（中盘平衡风格）。
第167次北大赛瑟（CCISSR）
双周讨论会
Insurance 2030: Trends and Challenges that Shape the European Insurance Industry
主讲人：Martin Eling（瑞士圣加伦大学金融学院院长、保险经济学研究所主任、保险管理学讲席教授）
主持人：贾若（必赢线路检测3003no1长聘副教授）
时间：2023年11月10日（周五）10：00-11：30
线上形式：腾讯会议，会议号：723 532 279，会议密码：1110
线下地点：必赢线路检测3003no1302会议室
语言：英文
主讲人简介：
Martin Eling is Dean of the School of Finance, Director of the Institute of Insurance Economics and Professor for Insurance Management at the University of St. Gallen. He is doing empirical research in the intersection of insurance business, economics, and mathematics. His research interests include a broad range of topics in strategic management, financial management, risk management, and asset management. The current agenda includes new research topics such as cyber risk and micro insurance. His research has been awarded by several leading institutions including the American Risk and Insurance Association (ARIA), the Casualty Actuarial Society (CAS), and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). Among other activities, he is also board member of Concordia, one of Switzerland’s largest health insurance companies.
摘要：
This talk highlights major trends and challenges the European insurance industry faces with respect to the next seven years. Among these are the interest rate environment, the changing customer behavior, and the role of insurance in a digital world. The session is interactive: The relevance of the trends and the position of the Chinese companies with respect to the trends is analyzed in a live survey among participants and compared with Swiss companies.
北大经院工作坊第753场
Inference on Strongly Identified Functionals of Weakly Identified Functions（有关弱识别函数的强识别泛函的统计推断）
计量、金融和大数据分析工作坊
主讲人：Xiaojie Mao（Tsinghua University）
主持老师：（北大经院）王熙
参与老师：
（北大经院）王一鸣、刘蕴霆、王法
（北大国发院）黄卓、张俊妮、孙振庭
（北大新结构）胡博
时间：2023年11月10日（周五） 10:00-11:30
地点： 必赢线路检测3003no1107会议室
主讲人简介：
Xiaojie Mao is an assistant professor in Management Science and Engineering at Tsinghua University. He obtained his PhD degree in Statistics from the Department of Statistics and Data Science, Cornell University. He has numerous publications in Management Science, Operations Research, and so on.
摘要：
In a variety of applications, including nonparametric instrumental variable (NPIV) analysis, proximal causal inference under unmeasured confounding, and missing-not-at-random data with shadow variables, we are interested in inference on a continuous linear functional (e.g., average causal effects) of nuisance function (e.g., NPIV regression) defined by conditional moment restrictions. These nuisance functions are generally weakly identified, in that the conditional moment restrictions can be severely ill-posed as well as admit multiple solutions. This is sometimes resolved by imposing strong conditions that imply the function can be estimated at rates that make inference on the functional possible. In this paper, we study a novel condition for the functional to be strongly identified even when the nuisance function is not; that is, the functional is amenable to asymptotically-normal estimation at root n rates. The condition implies the existence of debiasing nuisance functions, and we propose penalized minimax estimators for both the primary and debiasing nuisance functions. The proposed nuisance estimators can accommodate flexible function classes, and importantly they can converge to fixed limits determined by the penalization regardless of the identifiability of the nuisances. We use the penalized nuisance estimators to form a debiased estimator for the functional of interest and prove its asymptotic normality under generic high-level conditions, which provide for asymptotically valid confidence intervals. We also illustrate our method in a novel partially linear proximal causal inference problem and a partially linear instrumental variable regression problem.
北大经院工作坊第754场
适应无法跟上预计的温升（Adaptation cannot keep pace with projected temperature increase）
生态、环境与气候变化经济学工作坊
主讲人：陈帅（浙江大学长聘副教授）
主持老师：（北大经院）季曦
时间：2023年11月10日（周五）10:00-12:00
形式：腾讯会议，会议号：144-685-382
主讲人简介：
陈帅，必赢线路检测3003no1博士，浙江大学长聘副教授、研究员、博士生导师。任教于浙江大学中国农村发展研究院（卡特）、浙江大学公共管理学院，担任浙江大学农业与农村发展研究所副所长、农经副系主任。讲授计量经济学、资源与环境经济学、农业经济学研究方法论等课程。研究领域属于农业经济学、资源环境经济学和发展经济学，围绕气候变化与中国农业、空气污染的社会经济影响等议题开展研究。研究成果发表在JDE、JAERE、JEEM、JEG等发展经济学、资源环境经济学和空间经济学领域的国际顶级期刊；主持包括浙江省杰出青年科学基金、教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目和国家自科基金在内多个科研项目。2022年入选教育部“长江学者奖励计划”青年学者、2021年入选浙江大学“仲英青年学者”、2020年获评“中国青年农业经济学家年度学者”。
摘要：
An emerging argument is that since humans can readily adapt to changing climatic conditions, there is less need to pursue aggressive emissions mitigation strategies. As temperature adaptation is a function of repeated exposure over time, we need empirical approaches that can faithfully depict individuals’ temperature history to rigorously examine this claim. Using a longitudinal dataset representative of China, we construct lifetime temperature exposure unique to each individual based on their birth-dates, birth-locations, and movement history. We show that a 1°C increase in individualized temperature anomalies cause a 2% decrease in 1 S.D. of well-being, where most of the impacts are driven by “hotter-than-expected” weather. In turn, we show that while the adverse impacts of future temperature changes wane after accommodating for adaptation, acclimatization is unlikely to keep pace with future temperature increases except in the net-zero emissions scenario, indicating that stringent GHG emissions cuts are still needed even in this less-pessimistic scenario.
北大经院学术午餐会第189期
The Effects of Frequent Disclosure on Price Informativeness and Cost of Capital in a Keynesian Beauty Contest Setting
主讲人：魏旭（中央财经大学金融学院教授）
主持老师：高明（必赢线路检测3003no1长聘副教授）
时间：2023年11月10日（周五）12:30-14:00
地点： 必赢线路检测3003no1107会议室
主讲人简介：
魏旭，中央财经大学金融学院教授，龙马青年学者。他于必赢线路检测3003no1取得金融学博士学位，研究领域包括金融监管理论、公司金融理论、应用微观理论等。在《经济研究》《经济学（季刊）》《管理科学学报》和Journal of Banking & Finance、Journal of Financial Markets、Journal of Environmental Economics & Management等国内外期刊发表论文数篇，主持国家自然科学基金课题两项。
摘要：
We study the effects of more frequent public disclosure in a two-period rational expectations equilibrium model with short-term investors, thus featuring Keynesian beauty contest. We find that including public disclosure in every period generates substantially different results on how disclosure affects price informativeness and cost of capital, compared with the previous literature in the absence of public disclosure after trading. Specifically, the introduction of future-period public information can both increase price informativeness of the previous period through alleviating the beauty contest effect and decrease price informativeness through crowding out the informativeness of future disclosure. We find that more frequent disclosure unambiguously increases informativeness of all prices, in contrast to the independence result documented in the previous literature. In addition, more frequent disclosure has a more subtle effect on ex-ante cost of capital, again in contrast to the independence result documented previously. Our results provide novel empirical and regulatory implications.
供稿：科研与博士后办公室
美编：时之
责编：度量、雨禾、雨田
